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WILLIAM HAGUE'S DISCOURSE INVOLVING EU-UKRAINE ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT: UKRAINE AS OTHER OR SELF

KAPRANOV O.

The University of Bergen, Norway

This article presents a qualitative study aimed at establishing whether or not Ukraine is represented as concepts SELF or OTHER by William Hague, the UK Foreign Affairs Secretary (2010–2014). Specific aims of the study involve identification of concepts SELF and OTHER in William Hague's political online discourse concerning the Association Agreement (AA) between the European Union (EU) and Ukraine within the period from October 2014 until 15 July 2014 (Hague's resignation from the post of the UK Foreign Affairs Secretary). Materials of the present study involve Hague's online Facebook and Twitter discourse about Ukraine. Results of the data analysis reveal that Hague's discourse involving EU-Ukraine's AA is characterised by the presence of the concept SELF. This concept is embedded into conceptual metaphors 'EU as a Nurturant Parent', 'Association with EU as a Path', 'EU as a Common House', 'Association with EU as Sacrifice', 'Democracy as a Tree Taking Roots in Ukraine', 'Poland as a Friend Helping Ukraine', etc. which are concurrent with instances of conceptual metonymy.

Key words: EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, EU political discourse, OTHER, SELF, UK.

Стаття присвячена з'ясуванню особливостей репрезентації України в дискурсі Вільяма Хейга, колишнього очільника МЗС Великобританії (2010–2014). Одне з основних завдань дослідження – визначення того, як поняття SELF та OTHER втілені в політичному онлайн дискурсі Вільяма Хейга в контексті асоціації між Європейським Союзом (ЄС) та Україною. Матеріалом статті послугував онлайн дискурс про Україну, представлений на власних сторінках Хейга на Facebook і Twitter. Результати аналізу засвідчили, що характерною ознакою дискурсу Хейга стосовно України є наявність поняття SELF. Воно репрезентоване концептуальними метафорами "ЄС як батько", "Асоціація з ЄС як шлях", "ЄС як спільний дім", "Асоціація з ЄС як жертва", "Демократія як дерево", "Польща як друг України" та ін.

Ключові слова: Угода між Україною і ЄС, політичний дискурс ЄС, SELF, OTHER, Великобританія.

1. Introduction

The present article involves a qualitative investigation of concepts SELF and OTHER respectively in William Hague's political online discourse concerning the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (AA) in the period from October 2013 until 15 July 2014 when Hague resigned from the post of the UK Foreign Affairs Secretary. Specifically, the present study seeks to determine whether or not SELF and OTHER in the context of the EU-Ukraine AA are embedded into Hague's discourse via metaphoric or metonymic mechanisms of cognition, i.e. whether or not SELF-ing and/or OTHER-ing Ukraine in Hague's discourse involves cognitive metaphor and/or cognitive metonymy respectively.

It has been established in previous research that cognitive metaphor and cognitive metonymy play a significant role in the EU's political discourse concerning its SELF, i.e. EU member-states, and the EU's OTHER, i.e. countries outside of the EU, for example Ukraine and other Eastern Partnership's countries [13; 23; 34; 39]. Given that the present investigation of SELF and OTHER involves online discourse, which is characterised by the specific register of political content [12; 64], the focus on conceptual metaphors and metonymies embedded into SELF and OTHER seems to be pertinent.

The difference between SELF and OTHER is a pivotal point in any identity construction – personal, national, institutional or supranational [8; 27; 28; 32; 56]. As indicated by Coupland [17, p. 244],

“The dominant sense of the term ‘other’, in a cultural context, is in identifying a group – or an individual held to typify that group – that is considered not only different or distant but also alien or deviant, relative to the norms and expectations of the speaker’s own group”.

Consequently, SELF is expressed as a collective identity of belonging to membership of a distinct group, thus providing a system of orientation for self-reference and action [1, p. 82]. The representation of SELF and OTHER has been one of the research foci in cultural studies, critical discourse analysis (CDA) and in cognitive linguistics [63]. The dichotomy SELF vs. OTHER is especially relevant in the context of the EU’s identity [50].

Reflections on the EU SELF in relation to its non-EU OTHER may provide crucial insights into Europe’s self-identification [11]. Following this line of argument, it is suggested that the EU’s identity as SELF can only be constructed by a strict delimitation between SELF and OTHER, i.e. non-EU [4; 56]. As posited by Diez [20, p. 628], OTHER-ing of non-EU countries in political discourse may involve a variety of forms, e.g. i) OTHER as an existential threat; ii) OTHER as an inferior entity; iii) OTHER as an entity violating universal principles; iv) OTHER as a different entity.

Previous research suggests that general features in the construction of OTHER involve the multiplicity of socio-economic, socio-political and socio-cultural identities which are sustained and disseminated by individuals and institutions comprising SELF [19]. However, it should be noted that the EU as SELF is not a homogeneous entity, especially in terms of its identity. The EU is often regarded as *“a machine for negotiations, concessions and compromises”* [28, p. 990], where all the member-states have to achieve consensus on a variety of socio-political and socio-economic issues. However, a common EU identity is exacerbated by the presence of diverse political cultures which render a polyphone character to the EU’s voice as a SELF [27; 30]. For instance, the UK is a pertinent example of the EU’s SELF which constitutes the core of the EU SELF and concurrently with leaving the EU, commonly referred to as Brexit.

The UK’s special relationships with the EU have been a subject of intensive scientific scrutiny over the recent years [5; 29; 38; 40; 55; 57; 59]. From the early 1990ies onwards, the UK’s domestic politics have been marked by political semi-detachment from the EU [3], especially from its further economic and political integration, which PM Margaret Thatcher found evocative of Orwell’s “1984” [49, p. 216]. As indicated by Lowe and Ward [44:4], *“Britain’s relations with the EU have been variously portrayed as reluctant, skeptical and awkward.”* Interestingly, even in the context of the current Brexit, the UK as a part of the EU SELF *“has gained a distinctive European dimension, which is perceived as an important complement to, but not a replacement of, national foreign policy”* [1, p. 92]. In particular, the UK’s European dimension is manifested by its support of pro-European aspirations of those non-EU countries which comprise a heterogeneous non-EU OTHER, such as Turkey [4; 5; 21; 36; 51; 53; 60] and Ukraine respectively [30; 43; 58; 61; 62]. The UK has traditionally affirmed its support for the Ukraine’s future EU accession, even in the period of strained EU-Ukraine’s relationships following the controversial arrest and incarceration of Ukraine’s former PM Julia Timoshenko.

It is inferred from the current public discourse in the UK that Ukraine is regarded as a part of Europe. By referring to Ukraine as a part of Europe, the UK’s stance is in concert with a Teutonic and Northern European view of Ukraine’s Europeaness which posits that *“The spatial differentiation between Russia on the one hand and Europe on the other is also hard and fast: Ukraine is Europe, Russia is not.”* [50, p. 154]. In the UK’s political discourse, Ukraine is mentioned in the same context as other European states, as evident from the following quotation: *“In recent years, proposals have been made to expand EEA membership, for example to Western European micro-states such*

as *Andorra, San Marino and Monaco and Eastern giants like the Ukraine*" [16, p. 177]. Following the view of Ukraine as a part of the free trade zone with the EU, the UK has endorsed the EU's Eastern Partnership as a means of promulgating the EU values to 'Europeanise' Ukraine [54].

The EU's Eastern Partnership envisages a peaceful and prosperous Europe with Eastern Partnership's countries (amongst others Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine) being within the EU's cultural, legislative and economic spheres of influence [6]. The relocation of these EU spheres further eastwards and creation of the 'new' Europe in East- and Central Europe [31] involves progress, well-being, security, and high standards of living [41]. Thus, the EU's Eastern Partnership facilitates a gradual merger of the distinctions between Western and Eastern Europe, extrapolating the common EU SELF and re-defining the non-EU OTHER [46].

It should be noted that the UK, alongside with Poland, Sweden and the Baltic states has promoted offering Ukraine the EU membership prospect [52, p. 510]. Presumably, the promise of full membership might result in the former OTHER's competing to be 'European', as was the case in the former Communist countries prior to the Eastern enlargement [21]. In its turn, Ukraine has regarded the EU's Eastern Partnership as an interim solution to its full EU membership in the future [35; 52; 58; 65]. Ukraine's and Eastern Partnership countries' desire to be a part of the EU SELF is referred to as "*an obsession with 'becoming European', both in terms of EU membership, and also in terms of cultural and identity implications of 'being European.'*" [2, p. 186].

It is suggested that Ukraine as a country which actively seeks the EU identity possesses a trustworthy potential of an EU candidate [10]. Whilst Ukraine's full membership in the EU seems to be distant, the EU has proposed Ukraine and other Eastern Partnership countries to sign a far-reaching Association Agreement (AA). The signing ceremony of the AA should have taken place in November 2013 at the EU-Eastern Partnership's Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania. However, Ukraine's President Yanukovich does not sign the AA and provokes both an international and domestic dissent resulting in Ukraine's Eurorevolution 2013–2014. Following the post-Vilnius Summit dynamics between the EU and Ukraine, it remains to be elucidated whether or not the UK considers Ukraine European (and thus a peripheral part of the SELF), or does it start OTHER-ing Ukraine. The present article seeks to investigate SELF-ing and/or OTHER-ing of the post-Vilnius Ukraine in November 2013 – June 2014 by means of analysing William Hague's political online discourse concerning Ukraine and the AA.

2. Hypothesis and specific research questions

Previous research suggested that whilst the UK's position towards the EU was controversial [25], the UK official discourse concerning Ukraine and its EU aspirations was marked by a tendency to portray Ukraine as a European country which would join the EU SELF [16]. However, following the November 2013 Vilnius Summit it remained to be investigated whether or not the official UK discourse represented by the British Foreign Affairs Secretary William Hague would involve the portrayal of Ukraine as OTHER or SELF. Specifically, it was hypothesised that Hague's OTHER-ing and/or SELF-ing of Ukraine would involve cognitive metaphor and cognitive metonymy respectively. That assumption was based upon previous research findings [14; 15; 42; 63] which reported significant presence of cognitive metaphor and cognitive metonymy in the EU political discourse in general and in the UK political discourse in particular. Hence, specific research questions were formulated as followed:

- i) Would the official UK discourse expressed by William Hague involve OTHER-ing and/or SELF-ing of Ukraine's EU aspirations after the November 2013 Vilnius summit?
- ii) Would OTHER-ing and/or SELF-ing of Ukraine's EU aspirations by William Hague involve cognitive metaphor and cognitive metonymy?

3. Materials

The data involved William Hague's online discourse concerning Ukraine and its EU aspirations publicly available on his official Facebook and Twitter accounts. The corpus was structured on the

monthly basis from the period of time from October 2013 (the preparation to the Vilnius Summit) until July 2014 (Hague's resignation from the post of the British Foreign Affairs Secretary). It should be mentioned that whilst Hague made multiple Facebook and Tweeter entries involving Ukraine, especially in February 2014, some of the months, e.g. December, contained no entries concerning Ukraine.

4. Methodology

Qualitative methodology of discourse analysis introduced by Krzyzanowski & Wodak [42] was employed in the present research. Additionally, the methodology was based upon theoretical premises described by Neumann [50] and involved identification of the concepts SELF and OTHER in the corpus of William Hague's online political discourse concerning Ukraine and its EU aspirations. The analysis of cognitive metaphor and cognitive metonymy respectively followed research methodology employed in Musolff [48, 49].

5. Results and Discussion

The corpus of William Hague's online discourse concerning Ukraine's EU aspirations was examined for the presence of i) the concepts SELF and OTHER respectively and ii) cognitive metaphor and cognitive metonymy embedded in the aforementioned concepts. The results of the data analysis were summarised in Table 1 and Table 2 below.

Table 1.

Hague's Facebook data involving Ukraine

<u>Month/Year</u>	<u>Self/Other Category</u>	<u>Conceptual Metaphor/Metonymy Involvement</u>
December 2013	SELF	metaphor 'EU as a Nurturant Parent'
February 2014	OTHER	metaphor 'EU as a Nurturant Parent'
March 2014	SELF	metaphor 'EU as a Nurturant Parent'
	SELF	metaphor 'EU as a Nurturant Parent'
		metonymies SYMBOL FOR EVENT FLAG FOR THE COUNTRY MILITARY OCCUPATION FOR CRIME OUSTED PRESIDENT FOR REGIME
May 2014	SELF	metaphor 'EU as a Nurturant Parent'
	OTHER	metonymy MILITARY OCCUPATION FOR CRIME

Table 2.

Hague's Twitter data involving Ukraine

<u>Month/Year</u>	<u>Self/Other Category</u>	<u>Conceptual Metaphor/Metonymy Involvement</u>
October 2013	SELF	metaphor 'Association with the EU as a Path'
December 2013	OTHER	metaphor 'EU as a Nurturant Parent'
January 2014	OTHER	metaphors 'EU as a Nurturant Parent', 'EU as a Common House'
	SELF	
February 2014	OTHER	metaphors 'EU as a Nurturant Parent', 'Association with the EU as a Path'
	SELF	
March 2014	SELF	metonymies MILITARY OCCUPATION FOR CRIME SYMBOL FOR EVENT PLACE FOR EVENT COUNTRY FOR ITS POLITICS metaphors 'EU as a Nurturant Parent', 'Association with the EU as Sacrifice', 'Poland as a Friend Helping Ukraine'

April 2014	SELF	metaphors 'EU as a Nurturant Parent', 'Germany as a Colleagues Helping Ukraine' 'Democracy is a Tree Taking Roots in Ukraine' metonymy PLACE FOR EVENT
May 2014	SELF	metaphors 'EU as a Nurturant Parent' 'Military Supplies as a Flood'
June 2014	SELF	metaphor 'Association with the EU as a Path'
July 2014	SELF	metaphor 'EU as a Nurturant Parent'

It has been assumed in the hypothesis that William Hague's online discourse concerning Ukraine and its European aspirations, especially the EU-Ukraine AA, involves the presence of concepts SELF and OTHER. Data analysis reveals that these two concepts are identified both in Hague's Facebook page entries and in Tweeter short messages (tweets). As hypothesised, SELF and OTHER are characterised by the instances of conceptual metaphor and conceptual metonymy, which are embedded into these concepts.

Hague's SELF-ing of Ukraine

Data indicate a substantial presence of the concept SELF in William Hague's online discourse involving Ukraine and its EU aspirations. However, as evident from the data, Ukraine is not in the centre of the EU SELF, but rather on its periphery, being on the road towards the desired EU SELF via "*a future built on closer association*" (Hague, 2013). The following excerpt is indicative of a shared future between the EU and Ukraine as partners, which suggest a European Ukraine which is presumably a part of SELF:

1) "*The United Kingdom stands firmly with the Ukrainian people's desire for a future built on closer association with their European partners and respect for democratic values*" (Facebook on 11 December 2013).

Assuming that future and TIME in general are both conceptualised as DISTANCE [9], the focus of Ukraine's SELF-ing by Hague shifts towards the periphery of the EU SELF. Hague's view of Ukraine as a peripheral SELF is embedded into several types of conceptual metaphors, specifically 'EU as a Nurturant Parent', 'Association with the EU as a Path', 'EU as a Common House', 'Association with the EU as Sacrifice', 'Poland as a Friend helping Ukraine', 'UK and Germany as Colleagues Helping Ukraine', and 'Democracy as a Tree Taking Roots in Ukraine'. It is interesting to note that Hague's online discourse concerning Ukraine consistently evokes conceptual metaphor 'EU as a Nurturant Parent', where the EU is regarded both as a helping, assisting, providing entity as well as a caring, concerned, supporting entity which assumes the role of a parent in relation to Ukraine as evident from the following quotes:

(2) "*We will work closely with our EU partners in support of a new government in Ukraine, as and when that is formed*" (Facebook on 22 February 2014).

(3) "*Yesterday I spoke to Ukrainian Acting President Turchynov and made clear the UK's support for Ukraine's new government. ... And I assured him of the UK's commitment to working with other international partners and institutions to ensure that reforms by Ukraine are matched by international willingness to provide economic support*" (Facebook on March 1 2014).

(4) "*First, we want to see a stable, prosperous and unified Ukraine able to determine its own future free from external pressure or interference*" (Facebook on March 18 2014).

It should be noted that conceptual metaphor 'EU as a Nurturant Parent' is identified both in Hague's Facebook and Tweeter accounts, being more prevalent on his Facebook account as the only type of identifiable conceptual metaphor. Conceptual metaphor 'EU as a Nurturant Parent' and its variations 'EU as a Parent', 'EU and Its Member-States as Children', 'State as a Strict Father' constitute an everyday feature of the EU's internal discursive constructions [11]. Data seem to suggest

that in Hague's online discourse concerning Ukraine, conceptual metaphor 'EU as a Nurturant Parent' is instantiated as 'EU as a Parent of Ukraine', with the UK being an integral part of the PARENT construction:

(5) *"Leaving Council of Ministers in Vienna for Kiev. Widespread support for #Ukraine and condemnation of Russia's actions"* (Tweeter on 6 May 2014).

(6) *"UK will give 10m of urgent technical help for economic and political reform in #Ukraine. British team arriving in Kyiv today to work on this"* (Tweeter on 3 March 2014).

In the data, conceptual metaphor 'EU as a Nurturant Parent' co-occurs with other conceptual metaphors and their variations, such as 'EU as a House', 'EU as a Path', etc. The presence of these conceptual metaphors in the EU political discourse is extensively documented across the whole EU spectrum [48], especially in the EU's enlargement discourse [37]. In particular, previous research indicates that conceptual metaphor 'EU as a House' has gained currency in the EU discourse starting from the early 1990ies, with Europe being conceptualised as a house where the European family-nations reside [63]. Conceptual metaphor 'EU as a House' is present in Hague's SELF-ing of Ukraine on his Tweeter page:

(7) *"We are determined to keep the EU door open to the people of #Ukraine and stand up against any violence against them"* (Tweeter on 20 January 2014).

However, before the doors of the 'EU House' are reached, Ukraine must be on the path to the EU (i.e., cognitive metaphor 'Association with the EU as a Path'), making steps towards the desired goal of the EU membership. It is established in research literature that conceptual metaphor 'EU as a Path' is associated with the EU candidate-countries, i.e. those European countries which have been on the EU's official enlargement agenda [22; 23]. As a future part of the EU SELF, an EU candidate country should pursue a protracted path of change and reforms prior to becoming a part of the common EU construction, a metaphorical 'EU House'. Ukraine's path to the EU AA is implied by Hague in conjunction with the time needed to pursue reforms:

(8) *"Met Deputy Prime Minister Gryshchenko of #Ukraine. Still time for Ukraine to improve their record on reform before Vilnius Summit"* (Tweeter on 31 October 2013).

(9) *"PM called President Putin today to discuss how the international community could support Ukraine on path to stability"* (Tweeter on 29 February 2014).

(10) *"Congratulations to Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova on signing agreements with EU. A great step forward for them and their democracies"* (Tweeter on 27 June 2014).

In addition to the above-mentioned conceptual metaphors, Hague's SELF-ing of Ukraine is embedded in a range of cognitive metaphors, which seem to be specific to Hague's online discourse, such as 'Poland as a Friend Helping Ukraine' and 'Germany as a Colleague Helping Ukraine' respectively. Following Musolff [48; 49], these conceptual metaphors involve concepts from the love-marriage-family domain where they form conceptual clusters of the EU family relationships, focusing on solidarity within the EU family of nations. Specifically, the EU family cooperates together in helping Ukraine, with support and solidarity being afforded by a close friend (Poland) and a colleague (Germany):

(11) *"Glad to host sikorskiradek at foreignoffice today to discuss #Ukraine. Poland a vital ally and friend"* (Tweeter on 10 March 2014).

(12) *"Strong agreement in call with German FM Steinmeier on need for firm response on Monday if Crimea referendum goes ahead #Ukraine"* (Tweeter on 13 March 2014).

Interestingly, (11) and (12) illustrate complex dynamics within the EU as a family. Whilst Hague refers to his Polish counterpart as an "ally" and a "friend", whose visit evokes gladness and cordiality on the part of the British host, German Foreign Minister is mentioned in a more business-like micro-context in connection with the Russian annexation of Crimea.

The SELF-ing of Ukraine by Hague is conveyed by the reference to the common set of values, which underlie the EU SELF, namely democracy. Ukraine's democratic choice is conceptualised within the same ideological space as the EU SELF. In its turn, the common EU-Ukraine democratic space is in opposition with Russia as OTHER. Thus, burgeoning democratic values in Ukraine are compared with a tree taking roots in the ground, as exemplified by conceptual metaphor 'Democracy as a Tree Taking Roots in Ukraine':

(13) "*Russia's gov's actions in #Ukraine betray their fear of democracy taking root in their neighbourhood*" (Tweeter on 28 April 2014).

Whilst previously illustrated SELF-ing of Ukraine in the data is embedded in conceptual metaphors, there are instances of concurrent usage of conceptual metaphor with metonymic stand-for relationships. Hague's SELF-ing of Ukraine by means of both conceptual metaphor and conceptual metonymy is illustrated by the following quote:

(14) "*I visited #Maidan, scene of great sacrifices for Ukraine's future. Will be on BBC4today shortly to discuss*" (Hague's Tweeter on 3 March 2014).

Presumably, (14) is suggestive of conceptual metaphor 'Association with the EU as Sacrifice' and refers to the events of February 2014 when dozens of pro-EU protesters were killed by Yanukovich's government in the centre of Kyiv, *Maidan Square*. Those people protested against the regime of President Yanukovich who did not pursue closer ties with the EU after the Vilnius Summit in 2013. Writing about Ukraine's future, Hague implies its EU perspective which involves the cost of a human life, a sacrifice. Interestingly, this conceptual metaphor occurs in conjunction with conceptual metonymies PLACE FOR EVENT and SYMBOL FOR EVENT respectively. The former involves the name of the main city square in Kyiv, *Maidan Nezhalzhnosti* (Independence Square), usually referred to as *Maidan* where the events of the Orange revolution 2004 and Eurorevolution 2013-2014 took place. The latter conceptual metonymy is expressed by Hague visually by means of a photo of Hague paying homage to the killed protesters on Kyiv's *Maidan*.

The visual context portrays Hague's laying flowers (a prototypical symbol of homage) on the site of mass killings of the EU supporters in February 2014 (the event which the symbol represents). Presumably, conceptual metonymy SYMBOL FOR EVENT in (14) involves a significant visual component which facilitates the reader's engagement in the post (Moya Guijarro, 2011). Conceptual metonymy expressed in (14) illustrates an observation that "*political discourse is not restricted to the domain of 'politics as text and talk'*" [26, p.145], but embraces multimodality of representation, especially in online media, such as Facebook and Tweeter.

It should be noted that Hague's Facebook entries concerning Ukraine contain several instances of visual components involved in conceptual metonymy. For instance, low-level conceptual metonymy COUNTRY'S FLAG FOR COUNTRY [7] is conveyed iconically by means of depicting the map of Crimea coloured in blue and yellow, the colours of the Ukraine's national flag, with the coat of arms of Ukraine upon it (Hague's Facebook entry on March 18 2014). The visual icon of Crimea's territory depicted in blue and yellow of the official Ukrainian flag is an unequivocal indication of Hague's view of Crimea as a part of Ukraine. Another instance of using conceptual metonymy by means of visual representation involves a Facebook entry on 24 March 2014 with a photo of the ousted President Yanukovich with the printed slogan on the photo '*Yanukovich go home*' and the comment beneath it: "*Russia faces global isolation again. Those Russians who feel temporarily victorious do not realize how much their country has to lose...*".

Arguably, the metonymic mapping OUSTED PRESIDENT FOR THE REGIME is employed by Hague to imply that Russian President might repeat Yanukovich's fate one day. As of 24 March 2014, Yanukovich's government had been ousted for more than a month, so the slogan '*Yanukovich go home*' could not refer to the situation in Ukraine on that date. Hence, the metonymic mapping OUSTED PRESIDENT FOR THE REGIME employed in conjunction with the above-mentioned reference to Russia and its actions in the Crimean peninsula can be regarded as a "mini-drama"

[3; 47] construed with visual aids. In this mini-drama, Hague is as an implicit director who stages a scene with possible scenarios for the President of another country whose regime is similar to that of Yanukovych.

Hague's OTHER-ing of Ukraine

Whilst Hague's general view of Ukraine tends to be associated with a peripheral SELF, data point to several instances of OTHER-ing Ukraine in conjunction with Ukrainian authorities' undemocratic behavior during the Eurorevolution 2013–2014:

(15) *"I am deeply concerned by the Ukrainian Government's decision to send riot police to confront peaceful demonstrators on Independence Square this morning. As we have made clear to the Ukrainian authorities over recent weeks, the concerns of protesters should be met with dialogue not violence. Such action is unacceptable"* (Facebook on 11 December 2013).

(16) *"Concerned that #Ukrainian Rada has passed laws restricting personal freedoms. Ukraine's government must uphold democratic values"* (Tweeter 17 January 2014).

In Facebook entry on 20 February 2014 Hague writes about Ukraine's government as OTHER in relation not only to the EU, but to all the free and democratic world:

(17) *"The latest scenes and events in Kyiv, including the killing of more protestors we've heard about this morning are utterly unacceptable and indefensible and the United Kingdom condemns these actions in the strongest terms. By permitting such actions to take place, the Ukrainian Government is putting itself at odds with reasonable opinion all across the world"*.

The dynamic change in Hague's portrayal of Ukraine as SELF to its depiction as OTHER in (15), (16) and (17) respectively supports the claim that identity is not fixed, but continuously constructed and negotiated between political actors [53]. The shift from SELF to OTHER in (15), (16) and (17) is explained by Hague's view of Ukraine's Government as an entity which violates universal democratic principles [20].

Further instances of OTHER-ing in Hague's Facebook entries and in Tweeter messages concerning Ukraine involve Russia, Russian occupation of the Crimean peninsula and Russian aggression in Eastern Ukraine. Starting from the end of February 2014, when the former Ukraine's President Yanukovych is ousted, Russia is referred to as the non-EU OTHER in Hague's online discourse both on Facebook and Tweeter. Data analysis suggests that by OTHER-ing Russia, Hague is SELF-ing Ukraine, mentioning it together with the UK, USA and the EU in opposition with Russia:

(18) *"Have taken part in US-UK-Ukraine consultations on Budapest Memorandum. Strong unity there must be costs for Russia if they don't de-escalate"* (Tweeter on 5 March 2014).

The usage of the pronoun "they" seems to express Hague's distance and opposition towards Russia as OTHER and its politics in Ukraine. Data analysis reveals that Hague does not refer to Ukraine in third person plural ('they') even in the midst of the Eurorevolution in January 2013 and February 2014. To reiterate, it can be assumed that Hague's perception of Ukraine tends to be distant from the EU core, but still within the boundaries of the EU SELF. The identification of conceptual metaphors of 'EU as a Nurturant Parent' and 'EU as a Common House' in Hague's online discourse involving Ukraine seems to lend support to the above-mentioned assumption. The usage of 'they' in reference to Russia as OTHER is evocative of Neumann's [50] suggestion concerning centuries-long European discourse of portraying Russia and the Russians as OTHER [32; 45], or more emphatically as 'an empire of OTHERS' [18]. Following Neumann [50], Europeans have traditionally represented Russia as either uncivil or threatening. Arguably, this traditional view of Russia as OTHER is reinforced in the current Ukrainian context, as indicated by Moxon-Browne [46, p. 197]:

"Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia is crystallizing as another powerful 'other', especially as east and central European countries are courted as partners by the West in both economic and security spheres. As Russia appears to turn in on itself in its effort to redefine its own national identity, it is perceived wrongly perhaps by the west as distracting itself from western Europe."

In the 2014 Ukrainian context, Hague's reference to Russia as OTHER is based on the perception of Russia as an entity violating universal principles and posing a threat [20]. OTHER-ing of Russia by Hague is present in multiple instances within Ukrainian context, starting from the illegal annexation of Ukraine's Crimea by Russia in March 2014, e.g.:

(19) *"We oppose decision to deploy Russian troops on Ukrainian soil against wishes of #Ukraine gov and condemn any act of aggression"* (Tweeter on 1 March 2014).

(20) *"Lone Russian veto of Resolution supported by all but one other member shows isolation at the UN Security Council on Crimea"* (Tweeter on 15 March 2014).

The view of Russia as OTHER is especially salient in the context of sanctions imposed on Russia by the EU. Hence, from the perspective of the EU discourse, Russia finds itself in a similar position with the EU's OTHERS, such as Iran, North Korea and other rogue states:

(21) *"I'm pleased EU have agreed on asset freeze & travel bans on individuals not just in Crimea but Russia as well"* (Tweeter on 17 March 2014).

However, by OTHER-ing Russia, Hague is SELF-ing Ukraine. Following Erkem [24], it can be claimed that Hague's reference to Russia as OTHER facilitates the construction and acceptance of the new identity of Ukraine as a part of the Euro-Atlantic SELF. References to Russia as distinct from the Euro-Atlantic SELF are further reinforced by instances of conceptual metaphor and metonymy respectively both in Hague's Facebook and Tweeter data. Referring to the inappropriate actions of Russia as the OTHER in the Ukrainian and the EU context, Hague compares illegal military supplies to the pro-Russian rebels in Eastern Ukraine with a flow of arms which must be stopped. Arguably, this gives rise to conceptual metaphor 'Military Supplies as a Flood', as evident from excerpt (22) below:

(22) *"I welcome President Poroshenko's ceasefire plan in #Ukraine. Vital Russia gives visible support including stemming flow of arms"* (Tweeter on 20 June 2014).

In (22), conceptual metaphor 'Military Supplies as a Flood' is employed simultaneously with a low-level metonymic mapping COUNTRY FOR ITS POLITICS, where Russia stands for the politics it represents. Conceptual metonymy COUNTRY FOR ITS POLITICS is extensively used by Hague in his tweets and Facebook entries concerning Ukraine, as evident in (23) and (24) below:

(23) *"In Paris to meet John Kerry and Laurent Fabius and others to coordinate response to #Ukraine crisis. Time for Russia to talk to Ukraine"* (Tweeter on 5 March 2014).

(24) *"Spoken to Secretary John Kerry to coordinate next steps on #Ukraine crisis. Russia's failure to follow up Geneva agreement is indefensible"* (Tweeter on 25 April 2014).

In addition to the metonymic mapping COUNTRY FOR ITS POLITICS, (24) involves another low-level conceptual metonymy PLACE FOR EVENT. Specifically, Geneva in (24) is referred to as a place of negotiations between the EU, UK, USA and Ukraine on the one hand and Russia on the other hand. Hence, two concurrent metonymic mappings PLACE FOR EVENT (i.e., from Geneva as a place of negotiations for Geneva agreement) and COUNTRY FOR ITS POLITICS (i.e., Russia as a country for the official Russian foreign politics involving Ukraine) give rise to metonymic chains in the sense of Brdar-Szabo and Brdar [7].

It should be noted that metonymic chains are consistently present in Hague's online political discourse concerning Ukraine. For instance, conceptual metonymy PLACE FOR EVENT (e.g., Bruxelles, Geneva, Vienna for the events associated with these places; Budapest for the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 which institutionalised Ukraine's nuclear-free status simultaneously with the guarantee of territorial integrity and sovereignty in exchange for the nuclear-free status) and COUNTRY FOR ITS POLITICS (e.g., the UK for British foreign politics, Russia for its foreign politics, etc.). In the present data, the latter conceptual metonymy tends to co-occur with metonymic mapping MILITARY OCCUPATION FOR CRIME, e.g.

(25) *"I am deeply concerned at the escalation of tensions in Ukraine, and the decision of the Russian parliament to authorize military action on Ukrainian soil against the wishes of the Ukrainian government. This action is a potentially grave threat to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine. We condemn any act of aggression against Ukraine"* (Facebook, March 1 2014).

(26) *"Very concerned by reports of violence in eastern #Ukraine and suggestions of interference by #Russia, which would be a further escalation"* (Tweeter on 7 April 2014).

(25) and (26) respectively exhibit the presence of a conceptual metaphor 'EU as a Nurturing Parent' in its modified form, 'UK as a Nurturing Parent' which indicates that the British government acts as a concerned parent over the situation in Ukraine and condemns any aggression against it. However, the support of Ukraine by the British government evident in (25) and (26) is concurrent with an indication that the UK has identified its current non-EU OTHER, Russia.

6. Conclusions

The present article involves a qualitative study which elucidates whether or not Ukraine is represented as SELF or OTHER by William Hague, the former UK Foreign Affairs Secretary. Hague's political discourse on the topic of the EU-Ukraine AA is investigated within the period from October 2014 (active preparation for the EU's Eastern Partnership Vilnius Summit) until 15 July 2014 (Hague's resignation from the post of the UK Foreign Affairs Secretary). Specifically, it is investigated how concepts SELF as the EU and OTHER as non-EU respectively are embedded in Hague's discursive space involving the EU-Ukraine AA in particular and Ukraine's European identity in general. The data of the present study involve Hague's online discourse about Ukraine on Hague's official Facebook page and on his official Twitter account respectively. Results of the data analysis suggest that Hague's discourse involving EU-Ukraine's AA is characterised by the presence of the concept SELF. However, the data seem to suggest that Hague regards Ukraine on the SELF's periphery rather than as a part of the SELF's core. Hague's view of Ukraine as a peripheral SELF is embedded into several types of conceptual metaphors, e.g. 'EU as a Nurturant Parent', 'Association with the EU as a Path', 'EU as a Common House', 'Association with EU as Sacrifice', 'Poland as a Friend Helping Ukraine', 'Germany as a Colleague Helping Ukraine', 'Military Supplies as a Flood', which are concurrent with conceptual metonymies SYMBOL FOR EVENT, COUNTRY'S FLAG FOR COUNTRY, MILITARY OCCUPATION FOR CRIME, PLACE FOR EVENT and OUSTED PRESIDENT FOR THE REGIME respectively. Cognitive metonymy in Hague's data involves a substantial visual component which is present in conceptual metonymies SYMBOL FOR EVENT, COUNTRY'S FLAG FOR COUNTRY and OUSTED PRESIDENT FOR THE REGIME respectively.

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